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MEI Policy Essay
Egypt: Diplomacy and 
the Politics of Change 
Robert Bowker
Pressure for change at all levels — individual, family, and state — preceded the 
2011 Arab uprisings. It will continue, driven by inexorable factors including demog-
raphy, education, Internet-based connectivity among like-minded groups, wage-based 
employment of women, and changing business models.1 The following analysis of the 
Egyptian case provides a background for understanding Egypt’s challenges in the wake 
of President Mohamed Morsi’s July 2013 ousting and the military’s takeover.
Consider this example of changing realities. A young, female Egyptian univer-
sity graduate working successfully in the information and communications technol-
ogy sector, merchant banking, or advertising, with peer-reviewed performance evalu-
ation and achievement-based rewards, is experiencing for the first time, like some 
others of her generation, the realization of her creative potential amidst the demands 
of a competitive global marketplace. She will not take easily to expectations that she 
should reconcile herself to authoritarian values, dictated by others, when she leaves 
the office in the evening.
Demands for justice, dignity, and government accountability are the product of 
such cumulative forces of social change. These forces represent a paradigm shift in the 
Arab world in favor of popular political empowerment, from which no state ultimately 
can remain immune. Although change is a phenomenon that may be delayed, and per-
haps even reversed from time to time, it will not easily be denied. 
For the present, however, the values that underpin the authoritarian character of 
pedagogy and education, sustain gender imbalances, and support patriarchal family 
models remain the bedrock structural factors in both the social order and the political 
systems of the Arab world. Arab leaderships may pass their expiration date, but the 
systems from which they arise live on.
Except perhaps in Syria and Libya, where the corrosive social and political im-
pact of armed conflict has been extreme following the Arab Spring, states remain stron-
ger than civil society. Although their political authority has weakened since 2011, Arab 
states remain the primary mediator between civil society and world society. 
Arab governments will therefore continue to determine how far, and in what ways, 
other governments, organizations, and individual parties may be part of the process of 
change in justice and accountability. They will be resistant to unsolicited advice. They 
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will mostly be offended, not persuaded by criticism, well-intended or otherwise. This is 
not to argue against making such criticism, where avoiding double standards of values 
demands it, but rather to be aware that doing so may have unpredictable effects.
Many Western governments have significant foreign policy and security interests at 
stake in the outcomes of the unfolding debate concerning the civilizational benchmarks 
of Arab societies. They would wish their values to be respected, and hopefully admired, 
in the emerging Arab world. The same is true of the ambitions and concerns held among 
leaders of conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf. In the latter case, however, the val-
ues Gulf leaders wish to prevail and the interests they seek to pursue are very different.2 
In the volatile political environment of the years following the Arab Spring, ex-
ternal parties associated in Arab minds with ‘the West’ and seeking to participate in 
shaping an intricate, multidimensional Arab playing field, do so at their peril. This is 
the case even where change has begun taking place from within Arab societies, and 
where reform of traditional values and practices, with regard to human rights, has long 
been recognized as overdue by Arab intellectuals. The most important risk to avoid, 
particularly by many Western countries, is that of causing political disadvantage to re-
formists within Arab countries who advocate the values most Western countries would 
wish to see prevail, not only in regard to constitutional and ideological issues, but also 
in regard to human rights values.
EGYPT AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE
Against that general background, the contest of values unfolding in Egypt is of far-
reaching importance. A generation of Egyptian activists whose aspirations were shaped 
by the experience of 2011 and now, the events of 2013, must define their relationship with 
a government in which regressive forces are poised once again to play a significant politi-
cal role. Although they will continue to demand a voice in matters affecting their lives, 
those who wish to promote reform agendas, including the reform of internal security prac-
tices, will face significant countervailing forces at the political and the institutional level. 
Most Egyptians welcomed former president Husni Mubarak’s fall. They cele-
brated the courage and tenacity of their role in securing his departure. Aside from the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist elements of the Egyptian population, much the 
same can be said of those who participated in the overthrow of the Morsi government. 
But among the most significant consequences of the events of the past two years has 
been an almost irredeemable polarization within Egypt between Islamists — those who 
engage in politics and identify themselves through an Islamic discourse — and those 
who eschew being identified in that manner. 
Egyptians in general are socially conservative, depending to some extent on vari-
ations in socioeconomic status. But now with experience of inept, and for many, alarm-
ing, rule by the Muslim Brotherhood firmly in mind, most remain to be convinced that 
a full-blown parliamentary democracy remains preferable to rule by a strong (but just) 
authoritarian leader. For many, also, the ideology of the leader may matter less than the 
quality of government performance in meeting material concerns. 
2. Marc Lynch, “Money to Meddle,” Foreign Policy, July 11, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2013/07/11/money_to_meddle_saudi_arabia_uae_qatar_egypt.
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Ordinary Egyptians are also skilled at adapting to political and economic dysfunc-
tion. They are wary of changes from the familiar. Despite the changes in lifestyles, values, 
and expectations of many of the younger generation, there remains for most Egyptians a 
dearth of credible role models in society, politics, and business, who present convincing ev-
idence that paradigm shifts in those areas are both underway and deserve to be welcomed.
The highly contested political space which lies ahead for Egypt will be filled 
with ambiguities and uncertainties about what it means to be simultaneously Egyp-
tian, Arab, Muslim, and modern. As Egypt enters into a new, and in many ways more 
chaotic political era, Egyptians will have to decide the extent to which they support 
the preservation of constitutional values, including the separation of powers between 
parliamentary, executive, and judicial spheres. The degree to which Egyptians sup-
port constitutional values will have effects on the decisions that have yet to be made 
about the place of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders and supporters, the trials of the 
former elite and favored parts of the middle class, and the special status of senior 
members of the military and security apparatus.
While an electoral process secured the Muslim Brotherhood’s position as the key 
political force in Egypt in 2012, the transition from military rule under the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to civilian government was shaped in many re-
spects by the nature of the accommodation reached with SCAF over its future role, 
responsibilities, and interests.
Attempts by SCAF during 2011 to circumscribe the Brotherhood’s authority 
were firmly rejected, even as concerns grew in SCAF about the rising political influ-
ence of the Brotherhood’s Salafi rivals, and doubts were raised about the capacity of 
the Brotherhood to deliver on its side of an (alleged) understanding that an Islamist-
dominated parliament would not intrude into the military’s security role and business 
activities. The Egyptian judicial system also sought, but ultimately failed, to constrain 
the Brotherhood’s political agenda.
With the removal of Morsi and the decapitation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
political circumstances of the military and civilian political forces have reversed. It is 
now the reform-minded civilians, the judiciary, and remnants of the Muslim Broth-
erhood who will be seeking to preserve their interests, prerogatives, and visions for 
Egypt, while the military considers the degree to which such concerns should be recog-
nized and given practical effect.
In addition to the concerns and factors mentioned above, 2011 saw a shift among 
Egyptian Salafis from a primarily religious stance to one in which political activism 
was the norm. The Nour Party, the Salafi Hazim Abu Isma‘il, and other Salafi parties 
and popular identities proved second only to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 
Justice Party in their capacity to mobilize media attention and votes. 
With the departure of the Muslim Brotherhood from the political scene for the mo-
ment, at least, and the arrest of most of its senior leadership, the Salafi side of the Egyp-
tian political spectrum has been granted an extraordinary political opportunity to garner 
electoral support at the expense of the Muslim Brotherhood; and shape policy according 
to its ideological disposition and strength on the ground. The military and incoming gov-
ernment cannot avoid at least demonstrating some responsiveness to Islamist demands 
if they wish to be seen as inclusive of all political currents other than the Brotherhood, 
and avoid adding to allegations from Islamists that the new order in Egypt is anti-Islam.
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Consequently, the revision of the suspended constitution, the referendum, elec-
tions due to follow; along with the establishment of strong and well-targeted economic 
reforms are shaping up as major tests of the capacity of the Egyptian military and the in-
terim government to simultaneously contain the polarization within Egyptian society and 
politics; to protect the security of the state; and to maintain a positive and constructive 
relationship with the secular and non-Islamist opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.
But as was the case during 2012, any political and social space opened to the 
Salafis — including opportunities to shape policy in such areas as social issues, educa-
tion and women in more conservative directions — will be of concern to those who 
remain skeptical of the political intentions of the military. There is also a possibility of 
erosion of the enabling systems — press freedoms, religious freedoms, the separation 
of powers between the judiciary and the executive, equality of empowerment, etc. — 
upon which an effective democratic system would depend.
Despite the injection of financial support from the Gulf, the Egyptian military 
must also address as a high priority the fundamental economic issues and distortions 
that its predecessors have struggled to overcome.3 By any measure, a stringent reform 
program — especially in regard to the winding back of energy subsidies — will have to 
be instituted if Egypt is to find its way back to sustainable economic growth. 
A military-backed government, however, will not have the political legitimacy, 
let alone a political mandate, to insist on the robust economic policies that Egypt’s 
parlous circumstances demand. In June 2011 the military overruled moves toward a 
deal with the International Monetary Fund, ostensibly because it believed funding cuts 
could cover the budget deficit,4 but almost certainly because of fears about the expected 
political reaction to the IMF financial package. 
Moreover, if it should choose to avoid the conditionality of IMF assistance and 
turn instead to the Gulf states for support, Egypt’s sovereignty will be mortgaged to 
countries whose visions for Egypt’s future are far removed from the expectations of 
many of those among whom the 2011 and 2013 uprisings originated. And although the 
immediate promise of $12 billion in financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Kuwait following Morsi’s removal5 has placed negotiations with 
the IMF aside,6 that relief will be temporary at best.
As Egyptians begin to move on from the events of July and August, there is a risk of 
political and policy paralysis, reflecting substantial ideological and material differences 
between the Egyptian military, the anti-Islamists, Salafis, and the remnants of the Muslim 
Brotherhood themselves, which would cause further damage to an already distressed and 
vulnerable Egyptian economy. The continuation of emergency security and interim polit-
ical arrangements may restrict, if not altogether nullify, the influence of reformist voices.
3. Farah Halime, “Egypt’s Ticking Time Bombs,” Rebel Economy: Rebuilding after the Arab 
Spring (blog), April 23, 2013, http://rebeleconomy.com/economy/egypts-ticking-time-bombs/.
4. Alexandre Goudineau, ‘“IMF and Egypt: No News is More of the Same,” Egypt Independent, 
April 22, 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/imf-and-egypt-no-news-more-same.
5. Sultan Sooud Al- Qassemi, “Gulf States Embrace Post-Brotherhood Egypt,” Al-Monitor, July 10, 
2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/gulf-states-egypt-muslim-brotherhood.html.
6. Ulf Laessing and Maggie Fick, “Egypt’s Interim Government Gets to Work amidst Protests, 
Deadlock,” Reuters, July 16, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/16/us-egypt-protests-
idUSBRE96E01E20130716.
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On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood also faces major internal chal-
lenges. Even if they manage to survive the attempts of the military-backed govern-
ment to dissolve the group completely, eventually accept the revisions the suspended 
constitution envisioned by the military, and choose to participate in the elections that 
will follow, the Brotherhood may not be capable of overcoming the structural factors 
behind the group’s recent demise.
The Brotherhood’s leadership style and values, like those of other Egyptian po-
litical and social institutions of long standing, have long been strongly hierarchical and 
authoritarian. Its period in government was characterized by incapacity to share power 
and draw upon the skills and experience of those beyond their immediate power base.7 
Whether that situation arose out of hubris and a narrowness of vision at the leader-
ship level, or because its opponents refused to be part of a coalition-building approach 
the Brotherhood claimed to seek, is now of little consequence. It is most unlikely the 
Brotherhood will be presented again with an electoral path to power. 
At least for a few months, and especially if their senior leadership remain in-
carcerated, the Brotherhood and its supporters will probably remain firmly ensconced 
within a comfort zone of oppositional politics.8 But if the Brotherhood remain focused 
on survival and organizational discipline, and on highlighting the injustice of its recent 
experience, there will be little inclination toward, or opportunity allowed, for reflection 
and self-criticism about how opportunities were lost to channel the institutional power 
of the state to its advantage. 
Rhetoric aside, the Muslim Brotherhood would appear unlikely to risk its self-
destruction through organized acts of violence. Islamists have been deprived in both 
Egypt and Algeria of what they could claim to be legitimate electoral success. The 
Muslim Brotherhood may ultimately be driven underground, and the rejuvenation of 
al-Qa‘ida in Syria and elsewhere in the region ought to be of concern should jihadis 
return to Egypt in force. But despite certain dismal similarities,9 Egypt is not yet facing 
a situation comparable to Algeria in the 1990s. Although the Sinai Peninsula is shap-
ing up as a possible exception to that situation,10 and in Upper Egypt the military has 
shown limited commitment to asserting its authority, since August the internal security 
apparatus has been reinvigorated, and its operational tempo has increased markedly.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s sense of historical determinism would encourage 
pragmatic adjustment on its part to changing political circumstances, and the limited 
extent of politically-linked violence in 2011 and 2013 suggests there is little appetite 
among the organized opposition to depart from that approach. The US and most other 
Western governments see their inclusion in Egyptian politics as necessary, even if many 
7. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “The Muslim Brotherhood after Morsi: Can the Brothers Reboot?,” 
Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139571/carrie-rosefsky-wick-
ham/the-muslim-brotherhood-after-morsi.
8. Steven A. Cook, “Echoes of Nasser,” Foreign Policy, July 16, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2013/07/16/echoes_of_nasser_egypt_muslim_brotherhood_history.
9. Robert Zaretsky, “Egypt’s Algerian Moment,” Foreign Policy, August 20, 2013, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/20/egypts_algerian_moment_sisi_black_decade.
10. Amr Nasr El-Din, “And Then There Was Sinai,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace: Sada, Middle East Analysis, July 11, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/07/11/
and-then-there-was-sinai/geqa.
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Egyptians do not.11 But such logic may not be the final determinant of the Brother-
hood’s approach, nor may it be able to exercise the level of discipline over its support-
ers that a strategy of according primacy to political survival would require.
ARAB AND WESTERN RESPONSES
There is very little that Western governments can do to promote or pursue their 
interests directly in regard to the outcome of debate about the constitutional and so-
cietal values of the new Egypt. Should Western governments decide their interests in 
Egypt are worth pursuing, they have no option but to work in cooperation with Egyp-
tian government institutions and to deliver their ideas, experience, and material assis-
tance in close cooperation with Egyptian authorities. 
The results likely to be achieved through such cooperation will vary. It is a highly 
political process, always likely to be shaped by externalities, personalities, and bud-
gets. Acceptance of the prerogatives of sovereignty (on both sides), while calibrating 
the closeness of the relationship according to the quality of dealings, provides the only 
basis for each side to arrive at a reasonably durable balance, under any given circum-
stances, between its various interests and objectives, and those of its counterpart.
Additionally, the challenge of fostering a society which is not only adaptive but 
also progressive will require creative interaction on the frontiers between the global 
and the local in Egypt and the Arab world in general. It is in this context, framed by 
the impact of populist politics, globalization, and regional strategic developments — 
and such crosscutting influences as gender and consumerism — that the debate about 
external engagement with Egypt must be considered.
Egyptian reformers have largely failed at representing themselves within Egypt 
as a core part of a progressive Arab social and political structure. They risk being stig-
matized, especially by Egyptian audiences insecure about their place in a globalizing 
world and feeling vulnerable to global, Western-oriented external forces. Also of con-
cern is the more recent tendency to demonize the United States as the most convenient 
object of execration for both the Islamist and secular trends within Egyptian society.
The trend towards Salafi pietism within Egyptian popular culture; rejecting the 
normative environment of the secular Arab state; and drawing on horizontal linkages 
to like-minded, non-state actors in the Gulf and elsewhere for guidance and support is 
likely to continue. Celebrity Salafis in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait enjoy strong popular 
followings in Egypt. Egyptian civil society organizations linked to the Salafis, notably 
al-Jam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya and Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, all appear to have 
received substantial funding from Saudi, Qatari, and Kuwaiti sources.12
11. Bassem Sabry, “How Morsi, Brotherhood Lost Egypt,” Al-Monitor, July 4, 2013, http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/morsi-brotherhood-lost-egypt-bsabry.html
12. Al-Masry Al-Youm, “Five Salafi Organization Officials Referred to Trial in Foreign Funding 
Case,” Egypt Independent, March 14, 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/712291. In 2012, 
officials of the second largest Salafi NGO, Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya, were under criminal 
investigation for receiving almost $66 million from NGOs in Kuwait and Qatar between January 2011 
and March 2012. See, WikiLeaks, “Salafism on the Rise in Egypt Cairo 00000202 001.2 of 004,” 
Telegraph, February 15, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/egypt-wikileaks-ca-
bles/8327088/SALAFISM-ON-THE-RISE-IN-EGYPT-CAIRO-00000202-001.2-OF-004.html.
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If they were to withdraw from cooperation with the military there is little reason to 
doubt that the Nour Party and other Salafi elements would attract financial and moral sup-
port from non-state elements in the Gulf that are fundamentally antagonistic toward secu-
lar and liberal Arab forces they regard as instruments of the West. At the popular level 
there is sympathy for the view that the Egyptian military is guilty of a betrayal of Islam.13
Leading Saudi Salafi figures such as ‘Awad al-Qarni, Salman al-‘Awda, and Mu-
hammad al-‘Arifi chose, initially at least, to remain low-key contributors to the debate 
following Morsi’s removal. They were wary of the consequences of acting against the 
clear preferences of those within the Saudi government who were pleased to see the 
Muslim Brotherhood fall from power. But other Salafi figures, such as Nabil al-‘Awadi 
and Tariq al-Suwaydan in Kuwait, strongly backed Morsi, and an increasing numbers 
of Saudi intellectuals are also voicing their support.14
A key challenge from a Western perspective is to look beyond the pressures and 
frustrations of the moment in order to support Egyptian efforts to reshape their society 
in this complex environment in ways which will promote democratic constitutionalism 
and inclusiveness as core values. Those are values that may emerge over time as impor-
tant parts of what progressive-minded Egyptians regard as part of being both Arab and 
modern. If these values are to emerge, it will be conditional upon Egyptians building 
much higher levels of mutual understanding and respect. These values will have to be 
generated by Egyptians themselves.
Weighed against that process will be the determination of conservative Arab 
governments, at the forefront of which are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emir-
ates, to see that neither popular empowerment nor Islamic states without monarchies 
will be part of the Arab future. In that respect, they share a great deal of common 
interest with the Egyptian military. Whether and in what ways Qatar, too, might try 
to return to its previous pro-Islamist agenda — and the Saudi reaction to any such 
moves — can only be guessed at. But it should not be assumed that the Egyptian-
Saudi honeymoon will endure for long after Egypt returns to civilian rule. Mutual 
antipathy at the popular level between Egyptians and Saudis is deep-seated, and at-
tempts by Gulf states to impose conditionality — political, financial or otherwise — 
upon aid packages are likely to be rebuffed.
It is unrealistic for external parties to expect political leadership, communica-
tion skills, and vision of a high order in defense of progressive, but painful economic 
and political reform amid a bitter contest over Egypt’s political values and direction; 
especially when the notion of globalization is regarded with deep suspicion in Egypt 
and most other Arab countries. 
Moreover, where external parties, often concerned for important but more nar-
rowly-focused or politically-driven issues — such as the empowerment of women and 
the emergence of a critically aware and politically potent Arab civil society — seek to 
urge and support such reforms, they are at risk of complicating the process whereby 
those issues can be addressed on their own merits within Egyptian society. 
13. Marc Lynch, “Gulf Islamist Dissent over Egypt,” Middle East Channel (blog), Foreign Policy, 
August 18, 2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/18/gulf_islamist_dissent_over_egypt.
14. “Hundreds of Saudi Intellectuals Sign Pro-Morsi Statement of Support,” Middle East Monitor, 
July 13, 2013, http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/6560-hundreds-of-saudi-
intellectuals-sign-pro-morsi-statement-of-support.
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This is not meant to argue against Western countries attempting to help Egyptian 
reformers make a difference. But it is of vital importance — especially in the light of 
developments in August 2013 — to solicit and reflect carefully on advice from those 
reformists regarding the means by which they believe their objectives might best be ac-
complished. If external parties are to have a positive and constructive influence, even in-
directly, it will only be under circumstances in which all parties involved on the Egyptian 
side feel they are in control of their choices and are gaining something from the process.
Balanced against the overarching need for Western governments to do no harm are 
the arguments and, in some quarters, political pressure to use forms of leverage, includ-
ing in the case of the United States, military assistance, to underscore the strength of their 
concerns. The argument can be made that $75 billion in US military aid and decades of 
other incentives in the form of development assistance and financial support did nothing to 
address the shortcomings of Egyptian political and social life under Husni Mubarak. Nor 
did US military assistance significantly enhance regional stability during the Mubarak or 
SCAF eras. Some areas changed for the better, particularly in terms of economic reforms, 
and Egypt remained aligned with the West, but underlying Egyptian values did not. 
For their part, many Egyptians tend to see aid as an entitlement within a partner-
ship based upon respect for Egyptian sovereignty (especially where Western countries 
are concerned).15 In the case of the United States and the Gulf Arab states, aid is also 
seen as an affirmation of Egypt’s regional stature and an acknowledgement of the cen-
trality of Egyptian stability to other countries’ interests and in the security of the region. 
Reduction of US military aid following Morsi’s ousting would have negative bilat-
eral repercussions and almost no positive impact on domestic conditions in Egypt. Nor 
would it have much effect on US interests where Israel is concerned. There may be threats 
to delay US military overflight and Suez Canal transit arrangements, but giving effect to 
such threats would signal a drastic change in US-Egyptian relations, which would not 
seem to be where the Egyptian military wishes to go. Dealings between Israel and Egypt 
in regard to Sinai and the Gaza Strip will continue to be managed between their respective 
military forces and intelligence agencies because it is in their respective national interests 
to do so. Whereas some of the Egyptian military’s commercial interests linked to the 
defense assistance program would suffer if the US cut off military aid, the impact would 
be borne mainly among US defense suppliers and their US-based production facilities. 
Suspension of military assistance to Egypt may be used to fan an incremental 
increase in popular contempt for the US. However, the factors driving such antago-
nism are complex and deep-seated, and ultimately beyond the capacity of military as-
sistance programs to affect. To a very considerable extent, for example, the secularist 
bitterness towards the US for its perceived sympathy towards the Muslim Brother-
hood is a reflection of the polarization of Egyptian society that no amount of external 
advice or pressure will change. 
The policy choices confronting the US should therefore be based mainly on con-
sideration of their wider effects on the interests and values that the US position pro-
motes and the perception of those values in Egypt and beyond.
15. Mohamed Yonuis and Ahmed Younis, “Egyptian Opposition to U.S. and Other Foreign Aid 
Increases,” Gallup, March 29, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153512/Egyptian-Opposition-For-
eign-Aid-Increases.aspx.
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The US policy approach to Egypt can be calibrated to some extent. For ex-
ample, military training programs in the US should remain open to Egypt so as not 
to lose contact with upcoming generations of military officers, as unfortunately hap-
pened in Pakistan. On the other hand, if the US reaction to excessive use of violence 
against civilian demonstrators in Egypt is limited to rhetoric, the message to Muslim 
populations around the globe will be that the US is prepared to discriminate among 
governments committing human rights abuses according to whether or not the vic-
tims are Muslim. A reduction in military assistance to Egypt on the other hand would 
add some long-lost credibility to US claims to be nondiscriminatory in upholding hu-
man rights principles, even when those being subject to such abuses are ideologically 
opposed to the United States.
The message to other Arab governments conveyed by a failure to act would also 
be clear: the responses from the Western world to human rights abuses can be managed. 
Demonstrators in Bahrain, Yemen, the eastern regions of Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere 
may be subjected to repression by such means as their governments deem necessary.
Some forbearance may be warranted while Egypt searches, amid declamatory 
populist rhetoric, for a new equilibrium in its dealings with the US. But rejection of US 
counsel without consequences, among which a suspension or reduction in military aid 
would be a natural part, further diminishes respect for the US in the region. Such bilat-
eral effects as may arise with Egypt pale in comparison to the political, foreign policy, 
and strategic risks of allowing such perceptions in the Middle East to grow unchecked.
Condemnatory rhetoric without action is an orchestra without instruments. It 
could render democratic rights and values irrelevant to the region’s future. It also leaves 
the US on the wrong side of history because, as mentioned earlier, the drivers of change 
toward empowered Arab societies will continue.
Leaving aside the issue of military assistance, pressure also rightly exists on 
Western governments to be firm in support of well-regarded Egyptian civil society 
organizations and individuals, especially at this critical moment in the political his-
tory of the region. There is a need, in particular, to redress the decision by the previous 
Egyptian government to prosecute Egyptian and foreign staff of prominent and widely 
respected US-backed NGOs accused of interference in Egypt’s political affairs under 
the guise of strengthening the capacity of Egyptian political parties participating in the 
widened political space created by the downfall of the Mubarak regime. 
The full consequences of the decision to try some of those involved in the NGO 
activities, and their subsequent convictions, including the damage caused in Washing-
ton and Cairo to the US-Egypt relationship, were largely disregarded at the time on the 
Egyptian side, in a lather of political self-righteousness.16
 All sides lost, materially and 
morally, in the debacle which followed. 
It would be a mistake as a matter of principle, and in terms of the well-being of the 
individuals concerned, to leave that situation unresolved ahead of the restoration in due 
course of high-level political engagement between Egypt and the United States. That 
will be no easy task, however, nor will it be possible to revisit the issue in the near term.
16. Fayza Aboulnaga, “Why Egypt Moved against Unregistered NGOs,” Washington Post, 
March 10, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-egypt-moved-against-unregistered-
ngos/2012/03/05/gIQAEHrf1R_story.html.
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The acrimony of public and private commentary on the United States is unlikely 
to dissipate for years to come, complicating any progress toward securing a change in 
approach on the Egyptian side. The process of rectifying the injustice done to the Egyp-
tians, Americans, and others involved will present opportunities for spoiler roles to be 
played against the political authority of the military and of the government established 
under its protection. Should the convictions be overturned, there will be voices from 
disgruntled nationalist opinion claiming to be more robust than the military in defense 
of Egyptian sovereignty and resistance to external pressure.17 
Looking ahead, a balanced approach would avoid — as far as the political reality 
on both sides allows — exacerbating the sound and fury of the immediate circum-
stances of the relationship with Egypt. It would concentrate instead on maintaining and 
expanding a longer term program of capacity-building, especially, but not exclusively, 
beyond the Egyptian military. 
Lowering the temperature of political debate and recrimination on all sides would 
provide more potential for Egyptian civil society to operate effectively and, over time, to 
foster values of accountability and inclusiveness. Raising the temperature of the debate 
about aid in the current circumstances of Egyptian society however would be more than 
likely to serve the political interests of those most likely to stifle worthwhile reform and so-
cial progress. It would be all too easy to unintentionally provide more ammunition to those 
who seek to discredit or weaken progressive reformers who are already targeted because of 
their association, real or imagined, with external players and their alleged agendas.
The best avenue for the promotion and pursuit of US interests in Egypt remains 
engagement aimed at increasing Egyptian and Western exposure to the experience and 
aspirations of each side through strengthened institutional interaction, such as edu-
cation links through organizations in good standing such as AMIDEAST; people-to-
people contact; and commercial, scientific, and technical cooperation. 
By any measure, engagement with Egyptian society by the United States has been 
neglected, lagging well behind programs with countries arguably of lesser significance 
to the future of the Arab world and Western interests in that context, and beyond. There 
were, for example, only around 2,000 Egyptians studying in the United States in 2011, 
compared to more than double that number from Kenya, and almost 10,000 from Nepal, 
and 100,000 from China.18
 Egypt is not among the top 20 recipients of US economic 
(nonmilitary) aid, and Western development assistance to Egypt is at risk of declining.
Overly generous funding of civil society organizations and partner agencies is 
not the answer to fostering new values, even if such funding were permitted by gov-
ernments suspicious of the motives behind such programs. But helping to strengthen 
basic capacities in such as areas as health, nutrition, water management, agricultural 
research, and business management, including in some cases through cooperation with 
Arab and other multilateral development assistance programs, will foster the condi-
tions under which Egyptians may, in due course, address those issues themselves.
17. David D. Kirkpatrick and Steven Lee Myers, “American Defendants Leave Egypt Amid 
Growing Backlash,” New York Times, March 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/world/
middleeast/travel-ban-lifted-american-defendants-have-yet-to-leave-egypt.html.
18. “Open Doors Regional Fact Sheet Africa 2011,” Institute of International Education, 2012, http://
www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-Region/~/media/Files/Cor-
porate/Open-Doors/Fact-Sheets-2011/Region/Africa%20Region%20Fact%20Sheet%202011.ashx. 
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The next few years will be challenging so far as engagement with Egypt is con-
cerned. By increasing the positive and constructive exposure of civil servants, educa-
tors, intellectuals, and other opinion-shapers to the values and behaviors of a wider 
range of Westerners beyond the often tawdry imagery of the tourism sector; and per-
haps bringing closure to the collective memories of the indignities suffered by Egypt 
at the hands of outsiders, a more balanced appreciation of respective strengths, weak-
nesses, and aspirations may develop on all sides.
 
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the dramatic and ultimately tragic events of July and August 
2013, there is considerable potential for things to continue to go wrong, both for 
Western interests in Egypt, and for Egypt itself. A populist, chaotic political period 
lies ahead, with elements of xenophobia even closer to the surface of political dis-
course than during the Mubarak era. 
The promotion of Western interests will be more complex in a society rife with 
political and sectarian divisions that show no sign of healing. External parties will 
have to work, perhaps for an extended period, with successive Egyptian governments 
that may lack widespread popular support and may lack legitimacy in the eyes of a 
significant proportion of the population.
Diplomats will need to keep channels of communication open to all sides within 
Egypt, despite the challenges, both practical and political, which sustaining that approach 
has always entailed. Some Western governments may conclude that Egypt is more akin 
to Myanmar on the Mediterranean than a flawed but aspiring democracy; a few will prob-
ably reduce the scale and quality of their engagement with Egypt accordingly and direct 
scarce resources elsewhere. That would be a mistake. A strong signal should be sent in 
regard to military assistance. But enabling Egyptians to engage distinctively, confidently, 
and effectively with world society remains the means by which the forces for change in 
Egypt can best be accommodated and used for the benefit of all Egyptians.
Westerners should not lose sight of the fact that the desire to engage with world 
society among the younger generation of Egyptian activists is strong. It will continue 
to grow because the fundamental drivers of change in Egypt, as in most of the Arab 
world, are unstoppable. 
The risk — for the next few years at least — is that the capacity to fulfill young 
Egyptian activists’desire to interact with the international sphere may be circumscribed 
by a failure of political leadership to counter the determination of the Egyptian elite 
to preserve its privileges, and by the influence of those regressive forces which have 
surged to prominence by seizing political opportunities in the post-uprising period. But 
Egypt’s future as a nation rests in its own hands. Its success or failure will come down 
to issues of political leadership, vision, and courage. Interesting times lie ahead. 
